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In I978, Ernest Fitzgerald sued Richard Nixon, and in I994, Paula 
Jones sued Bill Clinton. In a landmark but closely divided I982 opin- 
ion, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court sided with Nixon and 
against Fitzgerald.' What does this mean for Jones and Clinton to- 
day?2 Ed Meese speaks for many when he insists that Nixon protects 
Presidents only for presidential conduct and that extending immunity 
to Clinton's pre-presidential conduct would be a huge and unprinci- 
pled stretch that would place Bill Clinton above the law.3 Other com- 
mentators aren't so sure that Nixon itself was rightly decided but are 
sure that Clinton's claim is much weaker. Terry Eastland has argued 
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An earlier version of this Commentary was presented on September 22, 1994 as the Hardy 
Cross Dillard Lecture at the University of Virginia School of Law; on October I9, 1994 as part of 
the Scholar-in-Residence Program at Hofstra University School of Law; and on October 26, 1994 
as part of the Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Lecture Program at the University of California at Davis 
School of Law. For helpful comments on earlier drafts, we thank Bruce Ackerman, Vik Amar, 
Ian Ayres, Jack Balkin, Susan Low Bloch, Steve Calabresi, Betsy Cavendish, Owen Fiss, Joseph 
Goldstein, Harold Koh, John Langbein, Burke Marshall, Vinita Parkash, Mike Paulsen, Jeff Ro- 
sen, Jed Rubenfeld, Peter Swire, Laurence Tribe, and Eugene Volokh. 
1 457 U.S. 731 (i982). The suit alleged that Nixon had unlawfully fired Fitzgerald in retalia- 
tion for his testimony before Congress about military aircraft cost overruns. 
2 Jones's suit raises four claims. She asserts violations of 42 U.S.C. ?? I983 and I985 that 
stem from Clinton's alleged conduct while Governor of Arkansas, a state law intentional infliction 
of emotional distress claim that arises from the same alleged action, and a state law claim alleging 
that Clinton and his aides defamed her while he was President. See Jones v. Clinton, Complaint, 
Civ. No. LR-C-94-29o (E.D. Ark. May 6, 1994). 
Editors' Note: As this Commentary went to press, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Arkansas ruled that no trial should occur until after the end of President Clinton's 
tenure, but that pretrial discovery could proceed now. This ruling may be appealed. See Jones v. 
Clinton, 1994 WL 721905 at *7-*8 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 28, 1994). 
3 Nightline: Presidential Immunity (ABC television broadcast, June 13, 1994) (transcript on 
file with the Harvard Law School Library); Crossfire: Justice Delayed for the President? (CNN 
television broadcast, May 25, 1994) (transcript on file with the Harvard Law School Library); 
Morning Edition: Sexual Harassment Suit Questions Presidential Immunity (National Public Ra- 
dio broadcast, June 15, 1994) (transcript on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
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that, if you reject Nixon's immunity claim, you presumably must re- 
ject Clinton's a fortiori.4 
We will show that all of this is dead wrong. Bill Clinton's claim 
for immunity is actually much stronger than Richard Nixon's - sup- 
ported by crisper arguments from constitutional text and structure, by 
more historical evidence from the Founding and early Republic, and 
by better modern-day policy arguments. Nixon sought absolute and 
permanent immunity from a civil damage action after he left office; 
Clinton seeks only temporary immunity from litigating a civil damage 
suit while he serves as President. We will show that the Arrest Clause 
of Article I, Section 6 and the democratic structural principles underly- 
ing this Clause cast light on Article II, and provide a sturdy constitu- 
tional basis for temporary presidential immunity. In the process of 
elaborating the best argument for Clinton, we will also show how all 
nine Justices in Nixon missed the point and in particular misread a 
key quote from the great Justice Joseph Story. We will outline a new 
theory of limited executive immunity that protects a sitting President 
and (most importantly) the American people he serves, yet does not 
put the President above the law, as Nixon did, despite the Court's 
protestations to the contrary. 
I. UNTANGLING IMMUNITY 
The Constitution nowhere explicitly describes what litigation im- 
munity, if any, the President merits by dint of his unique constitu- 
tional role. The document does, however, explicitly describe certain 
governmental immunities. Article I, Section 6 provides that: 
The Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Rieason, 
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their 
Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and 
returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, 
they shall not be questioned in any other Place.5 
A. Expressio Unius? 
At first glance, this Clause seems to be powerful ammunition for 
the presidential immunity skeptics. After all, no such explicit provi- 
sion exists for the President. Didn't our Founders clearly mean to say, 
by expressio unius,6 that the President is not entitled to immunity? 
4 See Terry Eastland, No Immunity for Clinton from Paula Jones's Charges, WALL ST. J., 
June 8, 1994, at AI7. 
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 6. 
6 The legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius means that the expression of one 
thing (here, congressional arrest and speech or debate immunities) by implication excludes other 
things (here, presidential or judicial immunities, or other congressional immunities). The maxim is 
in many contexts sound, but as we shall show, must not be applied clumsily or mechanically. 
'9951 EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGES & IMMUNITIES 703 
But this expressio unius argument is far weaker than it looks. In 
light of the explicit reference to "Speech or Debate" in Article I, let's 
look at the Constitution's other free speech clause: "Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."7 By similar ex- 
pressio unius logic, shall we say that the First Amendment limits only 
Congress - that the President may propound censorship edicts and 
the federal courts may issue gag rules without regard to First Amend- 
ment principles? Or shall we say under expressio unius that, in the 
absence of the First Amendment, only Senators and Representatives, 
but not ordinary citizens, would enjoy constitutional freedom of speech 
or debate? 
Surely not. Even if the First Amendment did not exist, the Consti- 
tution's overall structure and its commitment to democratic self-gov- 
ernment would require a broad freedom of speech and debate for 
citizens on issues of public concern.8 Article I, Section 6 had its roots 
in England, where Parliament was sovereign, and, as a self-governing 
body, needed wide freedom to debate public issues.9 (The very word 
Parliament - from the French parler, to speak - emphasizes the cen- 
tral role of speech and debate.) But in America, "We the People" are 
sovereign and must enjoy an analogous (though not necessarily identi- 
cal) freedom of speech and debate on public, political issues.10 So, if 
the First Amendment had never been adopted, we clearly would not 
read Article I, Section 6, by expressio unius, to say that Senators and 
Representatives enjoy freedom of speech, but citizens do not. Even if 
the scope of freedom were only analogous and not identical,11 it would 
be odd to say that Section 6 meant that no other immunities for 
speech existed; that such immunities were unconstitutional or extra- 
constitutional; or that to recognize such immunities in the teeth of the 
words inside Section 6 and the silence outside it would be to "make 
things up." 
So too with the words of the First Amendment explicitly prohibit- 
ing only congressional censorship. The general theory of popular sov- 
ereignty frowns on all suppressions of citizens' free speech, whether by 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. I. On the connection between these two clauses, see Akhil Reed 
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, IOO YALE L.J. II3I, II5I (i99i) [hereinafter Bill of 
Rights]; Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, io6 
HARV. L. REV. I24, I4I (I992); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, I96I 
SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255-56. 
8 See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
35-50 (1969); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
OF THE PEOPLE IOI-24 (I960). 
9 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, ioi YALE L.J. 
1193, 1267 (1992) [hereinafter Fourteenth Amendment]. 
10 See id. The citizen's freedom of speech might be only analogous rather than identical in 
that it might be, say, less absolute than the legislator's freedom. 
11 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-80 (I964) (recognizing broad, 
though not absolute, freedom of speech for citizens on issues of public concern). 
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congressional law, presidential edict, or judicial decree."2 If the Presi- 
dent and federal courts cannot censor citizens with a congressional 
law, it would be odd to think they can do so without such a law. As 
with Section 6, the First Amendment is best read not to bar, by ex- 
pressio unius, citizen freedoms against courts and executives, but 
rather to invite, by analogy, these unenumerated freedoms implicit in 
constitutional structure. 
It might be argued that the structural reasoning outlined thus far 
should go no further. Ordinary citizens, the people, may well enjoy 
unenumerated rights, especially if collective self-government is at stake 
- this principle is the heart of the Ninth Amendment's affirmation of 
the people's unenumerated rights.'3 But, it might be said, unenumer- 
ated rights and immunities for governmental officials qua officials are 
a very different kettle of fish. 
Are they really? Always? Consider a federal judge who, in the 
course of her published judicial opinion, criticizes some person who 
then brings a libel suit. Our judge is not a Senator or Representative; 
nor is she speaking "in either House." Must we read Section 6 by 
expressio unius to imply that our judge enjoys no analogous immunity 
in performing her public function and doing the people's business? 
Must we reject even a "constitutional common law" immunity that 
might be modifiable at the margins by statute?14 Surely expressio 
unius does not require this rigidity; and we should note that, since our 
nation's Founding, courtroom litigants have enjoyed absolute common 
law immunity from libel - an immunity arguably constitutionalized 
in the First Amendment Petition Clause.15 Should a judge have less 
freedom of speech than a litigant?16 In a working democracy under 
law, judges - like Senators, Representatives, and ordinary citizens - 
12 See Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 9, at I273-74. 
13 "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. For discussion of the connec- 
tion between this amendment and collective self-government, see Bill of Rights, cited above in 
note 7, at 1200. 
14 "Constitutional common law" here refers to judicially recognized principles that are deduc- 
ible from the Constitution and designed to implement the Constitution's structure and fill in its 
gaps but that may nevertheless be subject to statutory modification. We are indebted here to 
Professor Henry Monaghan. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Fore- 
word: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. I, I0-I7 (I975). 
15 "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. For an excellent analysis of the 
protection the Clause was designed to afford litigants, see Eric Schnapper, "Libelous" Petitions for 
Redress of Grievances - Bad Historiography Makes Worse Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 303, 343-47 
(I989). 
16 See Spalding v. Vilas, i6i U.S. 483, 497 (I896) ("The authorities ... are clear, uniform and 
conclusive, that no action of libel or slander lies, whether against judges, counsel, witnesses or 
parties, for words written or spoken in the ordinary course of any proceeding before any court or 
tribunal recognized by law.") (quoting Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, 8 Q.B. 255, 263 (I873)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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must have a wide zone of freedom to speak and print. Though the 
idea is not textually specified in Article I, Section 6, or in Article III, 
federal judges need absolute or near absolute freedom "of Speech [and] 
Debate." The very notion of jurisdiction is the power to speak the 
law,'7 the power, in John Marshall's immortal phrase, "to say what 
the law is."18 To do their job, and to serve the people, judges must be 
free to enter declaratory judgments of law and fact, judgments that 
may criticize and anger powerful people. Libel suits against judges 
interfere with these judicial functions and thus offend our basic consti- 
tutional structure.'9 Regardless of the specific words of Section 6, its 
deep structural logic applies to judges as well as legislators. 
Now consider a presidential speech (say, on health care legislation 
pending in Congress) criticizing some group (say, pharmaceutical com- 
panies). Is it sensible to argue that, because of expressio unius, the 
President has no absolute immunity from libel suits?20 Even if this 
immunity is merely a matter of constitutional common law, a la Jus- 
tice Jackson's Youngstown Category Two?21 To perform his role in a 
constitutional democracy, the President - like Senators, Representa- 
tives, judges, and ordinary citizens - must be free to speak out on 
issues of public concern. Indeed, the Constitution explicitly invites the 
President to make State of the Union speeches, to recommend legisla- 
17 See THE FEDERALIST No. 8I, at 489 n.* (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., I96I). 
18 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 177 (i803) (emphasis added). 
19 Our reasoning on this point tracks the Court's: 
[Al series of decisions, uniformly to the same effect, extending from the time of Lord 
Coke to the present time, established the general proposition that no action will lie against 
a judge for any acts done or words spoken in his judicial capacity in a court of justice 
.... "This provision of the law is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or 
corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should 
be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of 
consequences.. .." 
Spalding, i6i U.S. at 495 (quoting Scott v. Stansfield, 3 L.R.-Ex. 220, 223 (i868)). 
20 Consider the following Supreme Court passage: 
The law of privilege as a defense by officers of government to civil damage suits for 
defamation and kindred torts has in large part been of judicial making, although the Con- 
stitution itself gives an absolute privilege to members of both Houses of Congress in re- 
spect to any speech, debate, vote, report, or action done in session. This Court early held 
that judges of courts of superior or general authority are absolutely privileged as respects 
civil suits to recover for actions taken by them in the exercise of their judicial functions, 
irrespective of the motives with which those acts are alleged to have been performed, 
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, and that a like immunity extends to other officers of 
government whose duties are related to the judicial process. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 
aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503, involving a Special Assistant to the Attorney General. Nor 
has the privilege been confined to officers of the legislative and judicial branches of the 
Government and executive officers of the kind involved in Yaselli. 
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-70 (i959) (footnotes omitted). 
21 In his famous Youngstown concurrence, Justice Jackson outlined three categories of presi- 
dential power under the Constitution. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Category Two is the functional equivalent of consti- 
tutional common law - powers enjoyed by the President under the Constitution that are subject 
to modification and diminution by congressional statute. 
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tion to Congress, and to give a statement of reasons for any veto he 
hands down.22 In performing his high constitutional duties of demo- 
cratic deliberation, the President may need to speak in ways that criti- 
cize and anger powerful people. In this situation too, libel suits would 
offend the basic structure of the Constitution - for precisely the same 
reasons as would libel suits against Senators, Representatives, and 
judges.23 It would be downright silly to argue by expressio unius that 
the President lacks absolute immunity from libel merely because the 
clauses governing State of the Union messages, recommendations, and 
vetoes are less explicit than Article I, Section 6; so too, it would be 
obtuse to recognize absolute immunity for these and only these three 
communications (under expressio unius) while muzzling the President 
the rest of the time under penalty of libel lawsuits. 
This examination of the Speech or Debate Clause suggests that it is 
best read not to bar analogous immunities of coordinate branches but 
rather, if anything, to invite them. And the same holds true, we shall 
argue, for its companion, the Article I, Section 6 Arrest Clause. If 
Representatives and Senators should not be impeded ("arrested") by 
certain private litigation while performing the people's business (while 
"at session"), this Arrest Clause immunity should not bar, and if any- 
thing might invite, analogous immunities for members of coordinate 
branches while performing the people's business.24 
22 See U.S. CONST. art. II, ? 3; art. I, ? 7. 
23 Once again, our logic tracks the Court's: 
[T]he same general considerations of public policy and convenience which demand for 
judges of courts of superior jurisdiction immunity from civil suits for damages arising from 
acts done by them in the course of the performance of their judicial functions, apply to a 
large extent to official communications made by heads of Executive Departments when 
engaged in the discharge of duties imposed upon them by law. 
Spalding, i6i U.S. at 498. Consider also the words of Framer James Wilson: 
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick to discharge his publick 
trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the 
fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, 
however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence. 
JAMES WILSON, Of the Constitutions of the United States and of Pennsylvania - of the Legisla- 
tive Department, in I THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 399, 421 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., I967). 
Wilson saw members of all three branches as representatives of the public. See GORDON S. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 597 (I969). 
24 We do not here address what, if any, immunities might be appropriate for state officials 
under the federal Constitution. These immunities raise different issues, because unlike the Presi- 
dent and federal judiciary, state officials are not coordinate to Congress. 
We also bracket the issue whether state governors should enjoy immunity under state constitu- 
tions from state law suits. Although many state constitutions feature clauses for state legislators 
analogous to Article I, ? 6, these constitutions differ from the federal template in two key respects. 
First, most have historically lacked a strongly unitary executive analogous to the one created by 
Article II. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 47 
ARK. L. REV. (forthcoming I994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the 
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. I, 49-50 (I994). Second, in no state does the governor enjoy 
foreign affairs duties akin to the President's. As will become clear below, the unitary language of 
'9951 EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGES & IMMUNITIES 707 
Nor does any of this analysis violate the language or history of 
Section 6 or even the formal rule of expressio unius, properly under- 
stood. Section 6 nowhere explicitly rejects coordinate immunities- 
statutory, common law, or constitutional. The Framers simply pro- 
vided more details about the legislature in their prolix Article I than 
about coordinate branches; so more must be left to sensible structural 
inference when dealing with the sparser Articles II and III. Textual 
specification of legislative immunities might have been especially im- 
portant to some Framers because the practical protection of these im- 
munities would be committed to the other two branches in enforcing 
and adjudicating concrete cases. Whatever implicit immunities were 
appropriate for those other branches, it might have been thought, were 
effectively self-executing - effected by the President's refusal to en- 
force certain processes against himself, and judges' refusal to entertain 
certain suits against judges - and so perhaps needed less textual em- 
phasis.25 And even under a stringent expressio unius theory, Section 6 
could be read merely to set out those governmental immunities that 
Congress cannot in any way qualify by statute. 
Supreme Court case law also emphatically rejects the notion that 
Section 6 precludes implied immunities for coordinate branches. The 
Court, for example, has held judges and prosecutors immune for their 
official duties.26 These immunities, it can be argued, do not violate 
the central tenet of Marbury v. Madison, and of Anglo-American law 
more generally, that "every right . . . must have a remedy."27 Rather, 
the notion of judicial and prosecutorial immunity may be that one's 
Article II and the centrality of the President's foreign affairs duties are key features of our struc- 
tural analysis of the federal Constitution. 
Finally, we do not analyze the issue of what, if any, Arrest Clause-like immunity should be 
enjoyed by federal judges. Compared with Presidents, see infra pp. 713-14, and members of 
Congress, see infra pp. 711-12, judges may be more fungible from the perspective of democratic 
representation and democratic skew. Unlike a President, a judge is not always in session, twenty- 
four hours a day, every day; and unlike Congress, judges can reschedule their hearings and ses- 
sions with relative ease. 
25 In the absence of Article I, ? 6, legislators could have tried to enact similar statutory immu- 
nity, but an unpopular legislative minority might have been at the mercy of a partisan majority. 
The President might have vetoed such a law, and until such a law passed, members of the First 
Congress would have been vulnerable. Partisanship was seen as much less likely among a cadre 
of professional judges. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros- 
siter ed., I96I); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers 
of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 224-28 (I985) [hereinafter Two Tiers]. 
On the self-protective powers of executive and judicial branches, see THE FEDERALIST No. 5I, 
at 320-23 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., I961); 3 THE DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND 
OTHER PROCEEDINGS IN CONVENTION, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
245-46 (Jonathan Elliot ed., I830) (remarks of James Wilson at Pennsylvania Ratifying Conven- 
tion); and Bill of Rights, supra note 7, at 1194. 
26 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-12 (1978); supra note 20. 
27 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, I63 (I803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *109). 
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remedy for intra-litigation wrongs occurs within the lawsuit itself - 
by appeal - rather than by a collateral damage action.28 
B. Separating the Two Tiers of Immunity 
In a lengthy and important footnote, the Nixon v. Fitzgerald ma- 
jority properly rejected a wooden expressio unius reading of Article I, 
Section 6, arguing that "a specific textual basis has not been consid- 
ered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity."29 But the Court's 
desire to find a quick answer to Nixon's problem blinded it to the 
architecture of Section 6. To see this, we must carefully pull apart the 
two types of immunity mentioned in Article I. One type is "Immunity 
From Arrest": legislators' temporary immunity from litigating even pri- 
vate lawsuits while "at the Session" of Congress as public officers. The 
other type is "Immunity For Speech or Debate": permanent immunity 
from liability in lawsuits that arise out of the performance of public 
duties of democratic deliberation. This latter form is what all nine 
Justices in Nixon conceptualized as "immunity."30 
i. Permanent Immunity. - The Court's application of permanent 
immunity in Nixon was hard to justify by analogy to the Speech or 
Debate Clause or by other basic structural principles of constitutional 
law. Richard Nixon did not speak out against Ernest Fitzgerald in 
public debate; Nixon fired Fitzgerald from a civil service position. 
Worse still, Fitzgerald alleged that Nixon fired him because of Fitzger- 
ald's speech activities - whistleblowing testimony before the Con- 
gress. A broad commitment to the constitutional ideals of democratic 
self-government and citizen speech argued against Nixon's immunity, 
not for it. According to Fitzgerald's complaint, Richard Nixon vio- 
lated the Constitution itself (the First Amendment no less),31 and yet 
the Court shielded Nixon with permanent immunity. 
28 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 78i 
(i994) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment]. 
29 457 U.S. 731, 750 n.31 (i982); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 n.i6 
(i974) ("Nixon tapes case") (rejecting explicitly an expressio unius reading of the Speech or Debate 
Clause and embracing the notion of implicit presidential privileges). 
30 The opinions in the case are rife with references to the Speech or Debate Clause as a 
benchmark for assessing presidential immunity. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 73I, 750 
n.31 (i982); id. at 759 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 771 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White's 
dissent alone refers no less than six times to the Speech or Debate Clause. See id. at 765, 769, 
771 & n.6, 777 n.22, 78i. 
31 See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 740. Note that our commonplace description of Nixon as a "First 
Amendment case" is based on the idea, taken for granted by virtually the entire legal community, 
that mere presidential action can violate the First Amendment notwithstanding the Amendment's 
reference to "Congress" and the expressio unius maxim. See supra Part I.A. In New York Times 
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (i97i), a case involving unilateral presidential attempts to 
suppress publication of the so-called Pentagon Papers, no Justice argued that the absence of a 
congressional law meant that the First Amendment was inapplicable or irrelevant. 
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The five-Justice majority in Nixon prominently relied on an impor- 
tant quotation from Justice Joseph Story's classic Commentaries on the 
Constitution and, less prominently, on the words of Thomas Jefferson 
and John Adams.32 But as we shall show, all of these sources were 
badly misread in Nixon.3 The Nixon five also dismissed, too quickly, 
the concern that permanent immunity for Richard Nixon would leave 
Ernest Fitzgerald with a constitutional right without an adequate legal 
remedy.34 The Court pointed to longstanding judicial immunities,35 
but as we suggested earlier, these immunities do not necessarily violate 
Marbury's bedrock teaching that every right must have a remedy.36 
The Nixon five also trotted out various newfangled executive im- 
munities to blunt the message of Marbury.37 But the Framers would 
have been shocked by the notion that, as a general matter, executive 
officials could violate the Constitution and yet be held permanently 
immune. The modern judicial proliferation of various qualified immu- 
nities for constitutional torts is a twentieth century betrayal of found- 
ing principles. These immunities should be sources of concern 
things to be minimized or, ideally, eliminated - rather than spring- 
boards for further violations of Marbury. The Nixon five's compla- 
cent apologetics here are embarrassing, at least to those who value the 
Framers' first principles.38 
The only real argument left in Nixon was the claim that Ernest 
Fitzgerald had alternative remedies - remedies against the govern- 
ment itself rather than Nixon personally - that would fully vindicate 
his constitutional rights.39 If true, this would indeed satisfy Marbury, 
for the government may limit a plaintiff's choice of constitutional rem- 
edies as long as those remaining suitably vindicate the right at stake.40 
Marbury and the rule of law demanded constitutional justice for Fitz- 
gerald41 but not necessarily a pound of flesh from Nixon himself. The 
32 See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 749, 75i n.31. 
33 See infra Part I.C. 
34 See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 754 n.37, 758 n.41. 
35 See id. at 745-46. 
36 The idea here may be that, in order to bring the outside world under the rule of law, 
courts must exist and function; but in order to function, they must adopt special rules for in-court 
wrongs. One can also argue that a judicial action, even if egregiously wrong, is not "unconstitu- 
tional" so long as the erring judge has "jurisdiction." Jurisdiction is the right to decide - either 
way - and thus, in effect, the right to be "wrong." 
37 See, e.g., Nixon, 457 U.S. at 745-47 (relying on "good faith" immunity cases). 
38 For a very different view of immunity and Marbury than Nixon's, see Akhil Reed Amar, 
Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1484-92 (I987) [hereinafter Of Sovereignty]. 
39 See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 736-39 & n.17, 754 n.37. 
40 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: 
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1366-70 (I953). 
41 Impeachment provided a remedy against Nixon but not onefor Fitzgerald - not one that 
fully compensated him for the deprivation of his personal constitutional rights. The Nixon major- 
ity's emphasis on impeachment, see 457 U.S. at 757, 758 n.4i, was thus unresponsive to the 
guiding principle of Marbury. Contrary to the Nixon five's intimations, see id. at 754 n.37, the 
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government, after all, could have directly indemnified Nixon for any 
judgment that he owed to Fitzgerald, and a Fitzgerald suit against the 
government itself would simply accomplish this result more directly. 
But the Nixon dissenters denied the adequacy of alternative reme- 
dies,42 and the Nixon majority spent little time defending its claim of 
adequate alternatives. 
2. Temporary Immunity. - The other half of immunity, temporary 
immunity akin to Article I immunity from arrest, went wholly unno- 
ticed by Nixon's nine Justices. As Article I makes clear, members of 
Congress are privileged from arrest while Congress is in session. The 
Framers intended "Arrest" in this Clause to mean civil arrest, not 
criminal arrest. The Arrest Clause explicitly exempts cases of "Treason, 
Felony and Breach of the Peace"; and both the clear language of 
Blackstone's Commentaries and English debates well known to the 
Framers stressed that this exempting phrase was a term of art encom- 
passing all crimes.43 
Marbury Court did give William Marbury a remedy rather akin to the commission he sought: the 
Court's opinion was itself, like a commission, an official government document that declared that 
Marbury was indeed a justice of the peace. In addition, the Court's opinion on the merits sup- 
porting Marbury could serve as guidance to any other court in which Marbury might choose to 
refile. Marbury in word and deed upheld a plaintiff's right to a judicial remedy; Nixon did not. 
42 See id. at 797 (White, J., dissenting). 
43 For an excellent discussion, see Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 436-46 (i908). 
See also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 6o6, 614 (1972) ("History reveals, and prior cases so 
hold, that this part of the Clause exempts Members from arrest in civil cases only."); United 
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 521 (1972) (arguing that treason, felony, and breach of the peace 
encompass all crimes); Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76, 83 (i934) ("When the Constitution was 
adopted, arrests in civil suits were still common in America. It is only to such arrests that the 
provision applies." (footnote omitted)); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES ? 862 (Boston, Hilliard, Gary & Co. 1833) ("Now, as all crimes are of- 
fences against the peace, the phrase 'breach of the peace' would seem to extend to all indictable 
offenses . . . ."). 
Williamson relied in part on Blackstone: 
It is to be observed that there is no precedent of any such writ of privilege, but only in 
civil suits . . . . And therefore the claim of privilege hath been usually guarded with an 
exception as to the case of indictable crimes; or, as it has been frequently expressed, of 
treason, felony and breach (or surety) of the peace. Whereby it seems to have been under- 
stood that no privilege was allowable to the members, their families or servants, in any 
crime whatsoever, for all crimes are treated by the law as being contra pacem domini 
regis. 
Williamson, 207 U.S. at 439-40 (quoting i WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *i66). De- 
spite Williamson's correct use of Blackstone, the Court elsewhere quoted language that first ap- 
peared in the 1773 fifth edition and was refined in the 1783 ninth edition, not in 1765, as the 
Court claimed. Compare I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
i65 (4th ed. 1770) (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765) (omitting key sentence) with I WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND i65 (5th ed. 1773) (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press I 765) (adding key sentence) and I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND i65 (8th ed. 1778) (Oxford, Clarendon Press I765) (reprinting key sentence from 
fifth edition) and I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF ENG- 
LAND i65 (Richard Burn ed., gth ed. 1783) (Oxford, Clarendon Press I765) (revising key sentence). 
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The real question is whether civil arrest should be understood 
strictly and formally, or more functionally. Technical civil arrest - 
commencing a lawsuit by seizing the civil defendant's person - is all 
but dead today, and so the Arrest Clause, when strictly construed, 
shrinks to a virtual nullity. But "Arrest" may also be understood more 
functionally as extending to various civil cases that interfere with- 
that arrest - a person's performance of her duties in public office.44 
44 Despite a narrow interpretation of this Clause in Justice Brandeis's short opinion in Long, 
293 U.S. at 82-83, a broader reading may square better with the understanding of the Clause at 
the Founding. In Geyer's Lessee v. Irwin, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 107, 197 (Pa. 1790), the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court decided that a member of the Philadelphia General Assembly was "undoubtedly, 
privileged from arrest, summons, citation, or other civil process, during his attendance on the 
public business confided to him.... [Hlis suits cannot be forced to a trial and decision, while the 
session of the legislature continues." Id. at I07. In Bolton v. Martin, I U.S. (i Dall.) 296 (C.P. 
Phila. 1788), a delegate to the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention was served with a sum- 
mons. He pled privilege, and the plaintiff's counsel responded by arguing that "the protection of 
a member of the House of Parliament, extended only to the case of arrests, or personal restraint, 
and not to the service of a Summons." Id. at 297 (citations omitted). The court disagreed in 
language that is clear support for temporary immunity: 
[Mlembers of Parliament were privileged from arrests, and from being served with any 
process out of the Courts of law ... during the sitting of Parliament .... The act further 
directs, that where any plaintiff shall by reason of privilege of Parliament be stayed from 
prosecuting any suit commenced, such plaintiff shall not be barred by the statute of limita- 
tions, or nonsuited, dismissed, or his suit discontinued for want of prosecution, but shall, 
upon the rising of Parliament, be at liberty to proceed. 
We cannot but consider our Members of Assembly, as they have always considered them- 
selves, intitled by law to the same privileges. They ought not to be diverted from the 
public business by law suits, brought against them during the sitting of the House; which, 
though not attended with the arrest of their persons, might yet oblige them to attend to 
those law suits. 
The Defendant, therefore, must be discharged from the action. 
Id. at 303-05. Functional reasons led this court to stretch immunity along another axis - by 
protecting members of the Philadelphia Convention, who had no explicit textual provision to pro- 
tect them: "The members of Convention, elected by the people, and assembled for a great national 
purpose, ought to be considered in reason, and from the nature, as well as dignity, of their office, 
as invested with the same or equal immunities with the members of General Assembly ...." Id. 
at 303. Fifty years later, another court agreed with the idea of temporary immunity from all civil 
process: 
For, antecedent to this statute, [sitting] members of parliament were not only privileged 
from arrest, but also from being served with any process out of the courts of law .... 
[The statute provides] what may be a just construction of the rule in this country - "that 
the plaintiff is not to be barred by the statute of limitations" in the time consumed by the 
privilege, but is at liberty to proceed de novo after the cessation of privilege, which, being 
a public right, enjoyed for the benefit of the public, only so far interferes with private right 
as to secure the public good, on the termination of which the private right re-commences, 
unimpaired by the time of privilege, the statute of limitations ceasing to run when privi- 
lege commenced. ... 
. . .[The privilege] is consistent with, nay, necessary to the universal equality estab- 
lished in a republic. It is inseparably connected with the fundamental maxim in all free 
governments, that where the public exigency renders it necessary, for common preserva- 
tion, private right shall yield to public good. 
The privilege . . . protects them, while in attendance upon their public duties from 
arrest, summons, or any other civil process. 
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This functional immunity avoids undemocratic results: functional civil 
arrests of members of Congress while it is in session might skew votes 
in Congress and penalize innocent third parties, namely, the American 
people. As Joseph Story put the point in his Commentaries, explicitly 
building on Thomas Jefferson's famous Congressional Manual: 
When a representative is withdrawn from his seat by a summons, the 
people, whom he represents, lose their voice in debate and vote .... 
When a senator is withdrawn by summons, his state loses half its voice 
in debate and vote .... The enormous disparity of the evil admits of no 
comparison.45 
But Article I prohibits civil arrests only while Congress is in session; it 
implicitly permits the arrests when Congress is not in session. (And 
here we see a less wooden and more proper application of the expres- 
sio unius maxim.) Arrest Clause immunity is thus temporary immu- 
Lyell v. Goodwin, I5 F. Cas. 1126, 1127-30 (C.C.D. Mich. 1845) (No. 8,6i6). Lyell explicitly 
supported the temporary immunity idea, noting that the plaintiff could bring suit when the de- 
fendant had ceased his public duties: 
For the time being, while engaged in the public service, he is divested of self and of pri- 
vate concernment, and, as it were, dedicated in time and mind to the public service. Nor 
need there be private injury as a necessary consequence. There may be a time, when the 
privilege of these functionaries ceases, - when the special duty, that sets them apart to 
the public service has been performed, and their return to private life is clear and unques- 
tioned, when the public interest no longer demands their protection, and the private right 
to their attention can commence, and they be held answerable as any other citizen. 
Id. at I131. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court put a similar gloss on Article I, ? 6: 
In order to render this provision available to the extent of its necessity, it will not do to 
construe the words privilege from arrest in a confined or literal sense. A liberal construc- 
tion must be given to these words upon principle and reason. It is just as necessary for 
the protection of the rights of the people that their representative should be relieved from 
absenting himself from his public duties during the session of congress, for the purpose of 
defending his private suits in court, as to be exempt from imprisonment on execution. If 
the people elect an indebted person to represent them, this construction of the constitution 
must also be made to protect his rights and interests, although it may operate to the preju- 
dice of his creditors; but the claims of the people upon his personal attendance are para- 
mount to those of individuals, and they must submit. 
Doty v. Strong, I Pin. 84, 87 - 88 (Wis. 1840). Doty, in the spirit of Bolton, stretched Article I's 
immunity to cover delegates to Congress from territories. See id. at 88; see also Juneau Bank v. 
McSpedan, 14 F. Cas. 5I, 52 (C.C.D. Wis. i86o) (No. 7,582) ("In England, the privilege from 
arrest has always been construed to include the service of a summons. So in this country from a 
very early period."); Nones v. Edsall, i8 F. Cas. 296, 297 (C.C.D.N.J. 1848) (No. 10,290) (Grier, 
Cir. J.) ("Members of congress are privileged from arrest both on judicial and mesne process, and 
from the service of a summons or other civil process while in attendance on their public duties."); 
Anderson v. Rountree, i Pin. I 15, I 17, 124 (Wis. 1841) (following Doty). 
Later courts, in decisions such as Long v. Ansell, rejected this early broad reading of arrest. 
Long properly noted that the court in Bolton had quoted language from an early edition of Black- 
stone that had been changed in pOst-1773 editions. See Long, 293 U.S. at 82 n.3. But Long 
simply sidestepped the broader functional vision underlying all the early cases rooted in the demo- 
cratic public interest served by the privilege. 
45 2 STORY, supra note 43, ? 857 (footnote omitted). Note that Story explicitly extended the 
functional logic of the Arrest Clause beyond arrests to various "summonslesi," see id., as did 
Jefferson's Manual. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 15-22 
(New York, Clark & Maynard i873). 
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nity - stopping the clock on a lawsuit until litigation can occur 
without disruption of the defendant's public duties.46 
Though a strict expressio unius reading might limit the Arrest 
Clause to "Senators and Representatives," structural considerations tug 
the other way. Consider, for example, the Vice President. Surely he is 
not a "Senator or Representative," strictly speaking,47 and yet under 
the Constitution, he is empowered to preside over the Senate and cast 
a tie-breaking vote.48 If he were subject to civil arrest while Congress 
was in session, he could be wrenched away from these weighty consti- 
tutional duties of democratic deliberation by a single private plaintiff, 
in clear violation of the spirit and logic - but not the letter - of the 
Arrest Clause. 
The structural constitutional logic undergirding temporary immu- 
nity applies with even greater force to the President. Unlike federal 
lawmakers and judges, the President is at "Session" twenty-four hours 
a day, every day. Constitutionally speaking, the President never 
sleeps. The President must be ready, at a moment's notice, to do 
whatever it takes to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution and 
the American people: prosecute wars, command armed forces (and nu- 
clear weapons), protect Americans abroad, negotiate with heads of 
state, and take care that all the laws are faithfully executed. We 
should hesitate before arming each citizen with a kind of legal assault 
weapon enabling him or her to commandeer the President's time, drag 
him from the White House, and haul him before any judge in 
America. 
What's more, the President is the only person for whom the entire 
nation - We the People of the United States - votes. There are over 
500 federal lawmakers - the House and Senate can function if one 
member is absent, as the quorum rules of Article I, Section 5 make 
clear49- but there is only one President, in whom all executive 
power is vested by Article 1.50 Thus, the democratic skew that can 
result if civil suits impede - arrest - the President is far more dra- 
46 For many explicit expressions of this point, see note 44 above. 
47 See Richard D. Friedman, Some Modest Proposals on the Vtce-Presidency, 86 MICH. L. 
REV. 1703, 1720-21 (I988). 
48 See U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 3, cl. 4. 
49 See id. art. I, ? 5, cl. I ("[Al Majority of each [Housel shall constitute a Quorum to do 
Business"). 
50 See id. art. II, ? i, cl. i ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President") (emphasis 
added). On the importance of the vesting mandate and the unitary executive it creates, see Two 
Tiers, cited above in note 25, at 231-32 & n.92, 251-52 & n.15I (i985); and Steven G. Calabresi & 
Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1153, 1175-79 (1992). See also Memorandum For the United States Concerning the Vice 
President's Claim of Constitutional Immunity, In Re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled 
December 5, 1972, at I8 (Civ. No. 73-965) (Brief filed by Solicitor General Robert Bork in Mary- 
land District Court) ("[T]he President is the only officer whose temporary disability while in office 
incapacitates an entire branch of government."). 
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matic than for a typical Representative or Senator. To be sure, the 
Vice President always remains at hand, ready to step in for the Presi- 
dent in emergency situations, but the elaborate provisions of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment and past practice indicate that these emer- 
gencies should be the exception, not the rule.51 Yet they could well 
become the rule if a handful of citizens - acting independently or in 
concert52- could functionally arrest the President in his performance 
of the people's business and trigger his temporary inability "to dis- 
charge the Powers and Duties of . . . Office" under Article II and the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
This approach does not mean that the President is above the law. 
It simply means that, in cases seeking compensation for past wrongs, a 
President should be able to request temporary immunity to avoid in- 
terference with his duties.53 Whereas Nixon eliminated all remedies 
against the President, at least for constitutional torts committed qua 
President, arrest immunity would only "toll" - stop the clock on - a 
lawsuit and would preserve the plaintiff's ultimate remedy and vindi- 
cate the ideal of Marbury.54 Because of the Twenty-Second Amend- 
51 Because of the common practice of "balancing" a ticket with presidential and vice-presiden- 
tial candidates from different "wings" of a party, a shift of presidential power from President to 
Vice President can cause a serious democratic skew. For historical examples and discussion, see 
Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REV. 913, 938-39 & n.76 (1992). 
For a general discussion of succession issues and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, see Akhil Reed 
Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitution's Succession Gap, 47 ARK. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 1994). 
52 The issue raised by the Jones suit thus radiates far beyond Jones herself. The issue is one 
of precedents and slippery slopes: we must ask not merely what would happen if Jones's suit goes 
forth but what would happen if suits like hers can go forth and multiply. 
53 This immunity is of course waivable. Surely the President in whatever spare time he has 
should be allowed to litigate civil damage actions - or to watch basketball for that matter - but 
he should not be legally obliged to do either. As a practical matter, politics may sometimes create 
strong pressure to litigate now - or, again, to watch a basketball game - but political pressure 
should not be confused with legal obligation. In a civil damage action in the early I960s, then- 
President John Kennedy asserted litigation immunity under a statute. When that failed, he settled 
the case instead of asserting presidential immunity - a choice wholly consistent with our analy- 
sis. See Memorandum in Support of President Clinton's Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Presi- 
dential Immunity at 29 n.Ig, Jones v. Clinton (E.D. Ark. July 21, 1994) (No. LR-C-94-290). 
54 Beyond Marbury's vision that the ideal of "a government of laws, and not of men" entails 
that "the laws furnish [a] remedy for the violation of a vested legal right[,J" 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 135, 
I63 (I803), there is perhaps another basic element of the rule of law: the idea of no "special 
treatment" based on status. But temporary immunity for a sitting President comports with this 
norm too: Bill Clinton can toll a suit not because of who he is, but because of what he does - 
what he is now doing for the American people in serving them as their elected President. (Rich- 
ard Nixon, by contrast, sought a lifetime pass from legal accountability even when he was serving 
no one but himself.) Presidential arrest immunity simply applies a general functional principle to 
the unique circumstances of a sitting President preoccupied with weighty affairs of state. Tempo- 
rary tolling occurs in many other contexts in which similar hardship would be created by immedi- 
ate litigation - for example, cases involving military officers on duty, persons temporarily beyond 
the jurisdiction, and persons with temporary illnesses. See, e.g., Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief 
Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. app. ?? 501-525 (1988 & Supp. I994). 
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ment, the Constitution itself assures that plaintiffs will not have to 
wait more than eight years.55 
But eight years is a long time - much longer than any "Session" 
of Congress under Article I, Section 6 - and so perhaps the Section 6 
analogy breaks down at precisely that point. On the other hand, eight 
years is a lot shorter than eternity, which is how long the Nixon Court 
said Ernest Fitzgerald had to wait. On this point, at least, it may be 
politically awkward for the Court to distinguish Nixon: aren't Demo- 
cratic Presidents entitled to the same solicitude as Republican Presi- 
dents? (And on the facts of the Jones case, one may well ask if Paula 
Jones can equitably complain about delay after she waited three years 
to file her complaint.)56 
If sensible structural inferences lead us to think that a President, 
under the logic of Article II, merits an immunity akin to Section 6 
"Arrest" immunity, it becomes important to refine further the func- 
tional concept of civil arrest. Our legal order has long distinguished 
between damage suits for past, discrete wrongs, and injunctive suits to 
end ongoing harm. In effect, we should distinguish between civil dam- 
age arrests and ongoing harm injunctions. In arrest scenarios, plain- 
tiffs may be obliged to wait, but interest payments presumably can 
make up for lost time. Civil actions arising out of ongoing harms 
continuing possession of a steel mill in Youngstown,57 or a hypothetical 
divorce or child custody suit involving a sitting President - are quite 
different.58 Putting the point more textually, perhaps one could say 
that an ongoing harm is functionally one kind of "Breach of the 
Peace" and thus lies outside the proper scope of arrest immunity.59 
C. Nixon Revisited 
Not only does temporary immunity from "civil arrest" make good 
sense from the perspective of constitutional structure and policy, but it 
also makes the most sense of the historical evidence offered up by the 
55 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, ? i ("No person shall be elected to the office of the President 
more than twice ...."). In rare cases, the Amendment would allow a person to serve as Presi- 
dent for ten years. See id. 
56 See infra Part II. 
57 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (I952). 
58 The circle of potential plaintiffs in a divorce or child custody case is, of course, much 
smaller than the circle of potential plaintiffs who might seek damages for any past act, public or 
private. Injunctive suits arising out of a sitting President's private business concerns are also 
imaginable - consider, for example, a tort injunction to abate an alleged nuisance on land owned 
by the President. But if a sitting President deemed such nuisance suits a nuisance, he might well 
be able to place his business affairs in a blind trust and thereby free himself from distraction. 
This is not a realistic option for damage suits that arise out of past discrete acts rather than 
alleged ongoing harms. 
59 See supra p. 7IO (discussing the breach of the peace language of the Arrest Clause). Obvi- 
ously, mere refusal to pay damages for a past discrete harm during the tolling of a suit should not 
be seen as an "ongoing harm." 
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Nixon majority. The best evidence that the Nixon five had for their 
position, Justice White's dissent conceded, was from Justice Story. 
But now that we have tipped our hand and identified two types of 
immunity, listen to Story's words with fresh ears: 
There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, 
which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are 
confided to it. Among these, must necessarily be included the power to 
perform them, without any obstruction or impediment whatsoever. The 
president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or deten- 
tion, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this 
purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an 
official inviolability.60 
Let us note carefully Story's moves. First, Story believes that Sec- 
tion 6 does not exclude immunities for coordinate federal branches. In 
particular there are "incidental" presidential powers, not textually 
spelled out but "necessarily implied" by the spare words of Article II. 
Next, Story hints that these immunities should be understood function- 
ally, not formally - they are deducible from the nature of presidential 
"functions." Third, Story articulates presidential immunity as an im- 
munity from "arrest" - obviously conjuring up an analogy to the 
Arrest Clause of Article I, rather than the Speech or Debate Clause.61 
Fourth, this immunity is explicitly temporary, once again in keeping 
with arrest immunity rather than speech or debate immunity. It is 
immunity "while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office" - 
while he is in "Session," in the analogous language of Section 6. Fifth, 
it is immunity even for certain lawsuits based on a President's private 
conduct - immunity for his "person." Once again, this tracks arrest 
immunity rather than speech or debate immunity. Finally, Story care- 
fully limits this immunity to "civil cases" - just as the Arrest Clause 
(but not the Speech or Debate Clause) is limited to civil cases. 
This quote from Story could be challenged, or narrowly construed, 
were we writing on a clean slate. Perhaps Story is referring only to 
technical civil arrests, rather than to broader litigation impediments. 
In any event, Story is not speaking in his judicial capacity, but only as 
a commentator on the Constitution (though perhaps its most distin- 
guished commentator), and is writing almost fifty years after the docu- 
ment's ratification. 
Today, however, we do not write on a clean slate. We write in the 
wake of Nixon. A very broad reading of Story is inscribed in the 
United States Reports - it is the rock on which Nixon is built. If 
60 3 STORY, supra note 43, ? I563. 
61 In light of the rather precise parallels of language and logic between Justice Story's discus- 
sion of the Arrest Clause in ?? 856-62 and his discussion here in ? I563 of implicit presidential 
immunities, it is hard to see the parallels as wholly unconscious or coincidental. The same struc- 
tural vision informs both passages. See 2 id. ?? 856-62; 3 id. ? 1563. 
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Story was enough to win for Nixon, why not for Clinton? (Nixon was 
a Republican, and Clinton is a Democrat, but of course this should 
make no difference.)62 Indeed, as should be clear by now, a careful 
reading of Story does not support the result in Nixon,63 contrary to 
Justice White's glib concession in dissent.64 But a close reading of 
Story does support Clinton and our Arrest Clause methodology today. 
The Nixon majority had a couple of other high cards up its sleeve, 
a pair of quotations from Thomas Jefferson and John Adams featured 
in a long and important footnote that addressed the Article I, Section 
6 expressio unius argument. Here are Jefferson's words: 
62 Nixon recognized presidential immunity in the absence of an express congressional statute 
to the contrary. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 73I, 748 & n.27 (i982). So too, we today 
propose only a Category Two arrest immunity. See supra note 2i. Like the Nixon Court, we do 
not reach the question of the precise scope of congressional power to restrict this immunity. 
63 The Nixon Court should have been aware of the real argument in the Story quote. Fitzger- 
ald's brief declared: 
Mr. Nixon's countervailing citation from the I830's, like his other authorities, concerns the 
amenability of an incumbent President to process in a civil suit. The "official inviolability" 
that Justice Story referred to in his Commentaries was, by its own terms, limited to acts - 
arrest, imprisonment, and detention - that would obstruct or impede the President "while 
he is in the discharge of his duties of his office." Neither Story nor any other source cited 
by Mr. Nixon supports the proposition that a former President, when out of office, is im- 
mune from civil liability for his acts while President. 
The distinction between an incumbent and a former President is important. It was recog- 
nized at the time the Constitution was ratified. And it was strenuously argued to this 
Court in i867. Attorney General Stanbery then asserted on behalf of President Andrew 
Johnson that the President "is above the process of any court to bring him to account as 
President." But Stanbery acknowledged that this immunity ended with the President's re- 
moval from office. When "he no longer stands as the representative of the government," 
Stanbery said, 
then for any wrong he has done to any individual, for any murder or any crime 
of any sort which he has committed as President, then and not till then can he 
be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts. Then it is the individual they deal 
with, not the representative of the people. 
Brief for Respondent at i9, Nixon (Nos. 79-I738 and 80-945) (footnotes omitted). Fitzgerald's 
brief acknowledged that a suit against an incumbent President would be altogether different: 
Nixon's arguments obscure a crucial fact about the lawsuit at issue in this case. It was not 
brought against an incumbent President. Mr. Nixon was named as a defendant in July, 
I978, nearly four years after he resigned as President. Whatever drain on his time and 
resources the suit has caused occurred long after he left office; it had no effect on his 
performance of public duties. 
Id. at 26. 
Indeed, Fitzgerald's brief conceded tolling: "The burdens of litigation are not as onerous for 
the President or a former President as petitioner claims. With respect to the incumbent, the dis- 
trict court can stay all proceedings until he leaves office." Id. at 28; see also Memorandum of 
Justice Powell, 6th Draft at 22 n.27, Kissinger v. Halperin, 452 U.S. 7I3 (i98i) (No. 79-880), April 
6, i98i (unpublished draft opinion in pre-Fitzgerald case from Thurgood Marshall Papers, Li- 
brary of Congress, Box 268, folder 2) (acknowledging in a footnote discussing Story, Ellsworth, 
Adams, and Jefferson that "[t]he statements quoted here concerning a President's amenability to 
process apply only to sitting Presidents"). 
64 See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 776 (White, J., dissenting) (conceding that the Story passage "clearly 
supports [Nixon's] position but it is of such a late date that it contributes little to understanding 
the original intent"). 
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But would the executive be independent of the judiciary, if he were sub- 
ject to the commands of the latter, & to imprisonment for disobedience; if 
the several courts could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him con- 
stantly trudging from north to south & east to west, and withdraw him 
entirely from his constitutional duties?65 
And here are the thoughts attributed to Adams and Senator Oliver 
Ellsworth: "[T]he President, personally, was not the subject to any 
process whatever . ... For [that] would . . . put it in the power of a 
common justice to exercise any authority over him and stop the whole 
machine of Government."66 
As with the Story quote, these passages support Clinton far more 
than Nixon. Jefferson is clearly concerned about litigation that would 
"withdraw" a President from his current "constitutional duties" - a 
concern inapplicable to Nixon in I982 but very much relevant to Clin- 
ton today. As Jefferson put the point three days earlier in words that 
obviously apply only to sitting Presidents: "To comply with such calls 
would leave the nation without an executive branch, whose agency, 
nevertheless, is understood to be so constantly necessary, that it is the 
sole branch which the constitution requires to be always in function."67 
Note also how Jefferson's later reference to "imprisonment for disobe- 
dience" conjures up arrest, not speech or debate. 
As Adams and Ellsworth's last six words suggest, they too are re- 
ferring to a sitting President, not a former one: only suits against a 
sitting President would "stop the whole machine of Government." Sig- 
nificantly, Adams and Ellsworth's language goes beyond technical civil 
arrest and defines temporary immunity functionally to subsume "any 
process whatever." Their sweeping quote thus encompasses both civil 
and criminal prosecutions, yet surely they are not claiming, in light of 
the Article I, Section 3 Impeachment Clause,68 that a former President 
may not be criminally punished for offenses in office. Indeed, in lan- 
guage that all of the Nixon opinions overlooked, Adams and Ellsworth 
explicitly concede as much moments later and thus make clear that 
65 Nixon, 457 U.S. at 750 n.3I (quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (June 20, 
I807), in Io THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 404 (Paul L. Ford ed., I905)). 
66 Id. (quoting WILLIAM MACLAY, THE JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY, UNITED STATES 
SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA, 1789-1791 I67 (Edgar S. Maclay ed., I890)). 
67 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (June I7, I807), in ii THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 232 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905). 
68 U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 3, cl. 6 ("[BIut the Party convicted [in an impeachment court] shall 
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to 
Law."). 
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they are not talking about suits against ex-Presidents.69 So here too, 
the Court badly misread the historical evidence.70 
The stunning part of Nixon is not only the majority's hands-off 
attitude towards an ex-President, but also the fact that none of the 
nine Justices seemed to understand what Story, Jefferson, and Adams 
were really saying.71 We can now understand why Eastland and 
others might question the Court's view that "[t]he best historical evi- 
dence clearly supports the Presidential immunity we [the Court] have 
upheld."72 But the fact that the evidence fails to support Nixon 
69 In response to Maclay's statement that, "altho, President he was not above the laws," Ells- 
worth and Adams "declared You could only impeach him. [sic] and no other process Whatever lay 
against him." THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND OTHER NOTES ON SENATE DEBATES I68 
(Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Vett eds., I972). Maclay then "put the Case suppose the Presi- 
dent commits Murder in Streets. . . . But You can only remove him from Office on impeach- 
ment." Id. Listen carefully to Adams and Ellsworth's response: "Why When he is no longer 
President, You can indict him." Id. (emphasis added). 
As with the Story quote, the Nixon Court ignored Fitzgerald's admonition about the applica- 
bility of the quote from Adams and Ellsworth: 
The statements made in the course of framing and ratifying the Constitution do not sup- 
port Nixon's position. Nor do the observations of John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth .... 
These observations . . . addressed a question that is not before the Court in this case: 
namely, whether an incumbent President is amenable to process in a civil suit. 
Brief for Respondent at I8, Nixon (Nos. 79-I738 and 80-945). 
70 See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 75I n.P. The Court introduced the Adams/Ellsworth quote with 
the - embarrassingly untrue - claim that Adams had served as a delegate at the Philadelphia 
Convention. See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
I4-4I (19I3) (discussing the delegates); id. at 39 (noting that John Adams was in London). 
71 In essence, all three were arguing for litigation immunity rather than substantive immunity 
for sitting Presidents - immunity from claims made while President rather than for conduct 
occuring while President. (As Ian Ayres has pointed out to us, the distinction is akin to the 
claims-made/occurrence distinction in modern insurance policies.) Litigation immunity protects a 
worthy plaintiff (because it merely postpones suit), whereas substantive immunity does not (be- 
cause it bars suit). Litigation immunity deters conduct while in office - but conduct that is by 
hypothesis unconstitutional and should be deterred by the prospect of a later damage suit. Sub- 
stantive immunity does not chill this conduct; instead it immunizes even clearly unconstitutional 
actions - and that is why the Founders rejected it. See Of Sovereignty, supra note 38, at 
I484-92. 
If we are concerned that mere litigation immunity will lead to a flood of frivolous lawsuits (or 
even nonfrivolous but ultimately unworthy ones) against ex-Presidents, we should not recognize a 
substantive immunity that bars worthy and unworthy claims alike. Instead we should provide for 
fee-shifting, which discourages plaintiffs with weak claims and yet fully preserves remedies for 
plaintiffs with winning claims. See id. at II4 n.346. If Congress fears that the threat of liability 
for good faith mistakes will overdeter and paralyze Presidents (or other officials, for that matter), 
Congress need only provide for indemnification for good faith mistakes, for which government is 
in effect the better risk bearer than its employees in a Coasean world. See id. at II5; Fourth 
Amendment, supra note 28, at 8I2. 
In light of this analysis the real timing difference between Nixon and Clinton is not East- 
land's and Meese's occurrence-based difference that favors Nixon, see supra pp. 70I-o2, but a 
claims-made difference that favors Clinton. 
72 Nixon, 457 U.S. at 752 n.3I. It is also worth noting that Justice White's dissent argued 
that United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. I8O7) (No. I4,692), demonstrates that the 
President is "subject to judicial process." Nixon, 457 U.S. at 78I (White, J. dissenting). The 
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doesn't mean that the same goes for Clinton. On the contrary, even if 
Nixon is a twisted stretch of history and text, the historical evidence 
does provide sturdy support for temporary immunity from arrest.73 
majority did not disagree with this conclusion. See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 753-54. These Nixon 
opinions overlooked the fact that Burr was not an unavoidable intrusion on the President, for the 
President had the power to dismiss the prosecution at any time if he considered Burr's request for 
exculpatory material too onerous. Put another way, by continuing to hold Burr in detention, 
Jefferson voluntarily incurred certain duties, the disregard of which would be a kind of ongoing 
breach of the peace as long as Jefferson insisted on holding Burr in jail for trial. Any subpoena 
against Jefferson would have been a true negative injunction - provide evidence in your posses- 
sion or let Burr go - that could have been enforced, Marbury-like, without an awkward coercive 
order against Jefferson. Chief Justice Marshall could simply quash the indictment and let Burr 
free, much as he simply refused to take jurisdiction in Marbury itself. 
Nor does the Nixon tapes case, United States v. Nixon, 4i8 U.S. 683 (I974), preclude tempo- 
rary immunity. As in Burr, the President could have avoided any court-ordered mandate merely 
by ending the ongoing prosecutions, via a Caspar Weinberger-like pardon or by formally re- 
scinding via the Attorney General an executive regulation and dismissing both the special prose- 
cutor and the underlying prosecutions, as the Nixon tapes Court explicitly allowed. See id. at 
694-96. (Of course, these actions might have created a huge political backlash, but so might 
insisting on arrest immunity rather than waiving it; once again, we must distinguish between legal 
obligation and political pressure. See supra note 53.) The Nixon tapes case is also of course 
distinguishable from the Jones litigation because the former involved allegations of presidential 
criminal wrongdoing, Nixon, 418 U.S. at 687, which would overcome any arrest immunity deduci- 
ble by analogy to the ? 6 Arrest Clause, see supra p. 7I0. Thus, the Nixon tapes case is an 
awkward springboard for any assault on implicit presidential arrest immunity. See also supra 
note 29 (noting that the Nixon tapes case explicitly an rejects expressio unius reading of Article I, 
? 6 and affirms implicit presidential immunity). 
The Nixon tapes case does contain some loose language, but all this must now be read in light 
of the later decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald. Frankly, some of the loose language simply cannot be 
taken at face value today. See, e.g., Nixon, 418 U.S. at 694-96 & n.8 (0974) (treating as having 
"the force of law" a regulation that gave a kind of legislative veto to certain key congressional 
officials - a regulation that, as a binding law, rather than a political promise, would plainly 
violate basic constitutional principles acknowledged a few pages later, id. at 704, and resound- 
ingly affirmed a few years later in I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 9I9, 945-46 (i983)); Nixon, 418 
U.S. at 709-I3 (glossing over key differences between case at hand, in which the prosecutor was 
seeking to pierce presidential privilege to find inculpatory evidence and Burr-like cases in which 
defendant with due process rights sought exculpatory evidence). In the end, the Nixon tapes 
Court acquiesced in an untidy opinion by Chief Justice Burger that, on the facts of the case, 
reached the obviously right result. Richard Nixon was the head of an ongoing conspiracy to 
obstruct justice and was using the Oval Office itself as the hub of that conspiracy; and the Court 
had evidence under seal that made all this clear. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 687 & n.4, 689, 700. 
The Court's occasionally strained readings of the Constitution, case law, and regulations must be 
analyzed in light of what the Court delicately described as the "unique setting" and "unique facts 
of this case." Nixon, 4I8 U.S. at 69i, 697; see also id. at 700 (stressing material under seal as the 
basis for the Court's conclusion); id. at 687-88, 70I (relying subtly on Nixon's status as an 
unindicted co-conspirator); id. at 7I2 n.20 (invoking by analogy a case in which the strong pre- 
sumptive privilege of jury deliberation proceedings yielded in the face of credible claims of crimi- 
nal misconduct). 
73 To put the point slightly differently, we are suggesting that President Clinton's immunity 
should not turn on whether his alleged conduct towards Jones was an "official" duty or not (a 
holdover of viewing immunity through the prism of the Speech or Debate Clause), but rather 
should turn on whether the Jones suit and others like it, see supra note 52, could functionally 
"Arrest" the President while at "Session." 
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Despite what the pundits are saying, Clinton has a far stronger case 
than Nixon had. 
II. POSSIBLE PRIVILEGES 
The concept of a President's immunity from functional "Arrest" 
while in "Session" is a modest one - waivable, temporary, and per- 
haps subject to congressional modification. Yet from another perspec- 
tive, arrest immunity is absolute and categorical - it does not balance 
or weigh the unique features of a given case. It does not distinguish 
between a case likely to arrest the President in litigation for two 
hours, and one likely to arrest him for two months. It does not focus 
on the equities of a particular plaintiff or her special need for speedy 
adjudication. It does not reflect the fact that some claims are more 
difficult than others to revive and to adjudicate after a long delay. 
For some, the bright-line quality of arrest immunity - supported 
by a textual analogy to the bright-line rule of Article I, Section 6, by 
the categorical language of Story, Jefferson, and Adams,75 and by the 
prospect that political pressure can be trusted to induce presidential 
waiver in appropriate cases - will count as a juridical virtue. For 
others, the medicine of absolute arrest immunity will taste too strong. 
For those in this second group - scholars, lawyers, and judges - we 
shall briefly provide a catalogue of weaker prescriptions: presidential 
privileges attentive to the structural arguments and historical evidence 
presented above but packaged in lower dosages and blended with 
other general legal principles. 
A. Equitable Tolling 
In some situations, arrest immunity may work a grave injustice 
against a worthy and diligent plaintiff. Imagine a pedestrian crushed 
by a transition team bus (with Clinton at the wheel) one week before 
the Clinton inauguration. Obviously there is no time to file suit, con- 
duct discovery, litigate the case, and pursue an appeal before Inaugu- 
ration Day. This plaintiff might have to pay huge out-of-pocket 
hospital bills and yet, under absolute arrest immunity, may be forced 
to wait eight years to be made whole. 
A more flexible, "equitable" version of presidential immunity would 
distinguish between cases in which a plaintiff could have brought suit 
before Inauguration Day and cases in which a plaintiff could not. The 
structural logic here is the same one that drives arrest immunity: a 
suit against a sitting President in effect impleads innocent third parties 
- the American people - whose democratically chosen leader is ob- 
structed in discharging his unique and awesome constitutional duties. 
74 See supra p. 702. 
75 See supra Part I.C. 
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But the application in this situation is more flexible and equitable.76 
Only those cases in which plaintiffs themselves choose to sue while the 
President is in session are automatically tolled. Other cases (like our 
hypothetical pedestrian's) could be selectively tolled, depending on fac- 
tors such as the likely amount of intrusion on a President's time, the 
practical freezability of a case, and the extent of out-of-pocket losses 
that call for quick recoupment. 
With this rule in place, plaintiffs who have claims against would-be 
Presidents would have strong incentives to bring suit well before Inau- 
guration Day.77 Pre-inaugural suits are exactly what constitutional 
structure and history counsel. The constitutional evil to be avoided is 
distracting - arresting - litigation while the President is at session. 
Litigation after - or before - a President's term is just fine. A bo- 
nus of equitable tolling is that pre-presidential litigation may bring in- 
formation to light for the American people, as well as the courts, 
before We the People make our momentous choice on Election Day. 
Under a regime of equitable tolling, Paula Jones's case looks rather 
different from our hypothetical pedestrian's. Jones saw the metaphoric 
Inauguration Bus coming; she was not blindsided. She did not sud- 
denly wake up one day and discover - mirabile dictu - that Bill 
Clinton had become President. Why then, did Jones not bring suit 
much earlier, when the American people would not have been invol- 
untarily dragged into litigation as de facto third party defendants and 
when litigation would not have disrupted constitutional government? 
Unless she can answer this question persuasively, an equitable tolling 
approach would put her lawsuit on hold.78 
B. Equitable Dismissal 
An equally flexible but more emphatic approach would dismiss 
Jones's suit with prejudice, unless she can persuasively explain why 
she sat on her claims until after Inauguration. Like tolling, dismissal 
would of course create strong incentives for future plaintiffs like Jones 
to bring suit before presidential elections rather than after them. Like 
tolling, dismissal is more flexible and less categorical than arrest im- 
munity: dismissal would be case-specific, and could, for example, dis- 
tinguish between Jones's suit and our hypothetical pedestrian's. 
The idea here is that litigation delay - temporary immunity or 
tolling - at times hurts defendants and not just plaintiffs. A Presi- 
76 One reason for a more flexible application of presidential arrest immunity stems from the 
greater potential hardship on plaintiffs than in the Article I context, since presidential "sessions' 
run much longer than congressional ones. See supra pp. 7I4-I5. 
77 "Well before" allows the case to be tried before Inauguration. Aware of the significance of 
Inauguration, the parties and the judges would probably expedite judicial proceedings. 
78 Jones's case does not appear to be one of a repressed memory; her complaint claims that 
she told others about the alleged encounter with then-Governor Clinton within days of its occur- 
rence. See Jones v. Clinton, Complaint, Civ. No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark. May 6, I994). 
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dent's memory of the facts of any one case will no doubt fade over 
eight years, while she is preoccupied by many and weighty matters of 
state, whereas a single-minded plaintiff may be able to rehearse his 
story over the years. This concern can vividly arise in a case turning 
on facts more than on law, especially if testimonial credibility is a key 
issue. By strategically manipulating the timing of a lawsuit - delay- 
ing without good reason until after Inauguration - a plaintiff may 
place a President who deserves to win the suit in a cruel trilemma: 
drop vital affairs of state to litigate now and prevail (the "betray the 
people/waiver" option), or pay off unmeritorious claims (the "nuisance 
value/extortion floodgates" option), or wait until out of office and de- 
fend at a disadvantage (the "can't remember/look like a liar or a dope" 
option). To discourage precisely this kind of strategic manipulation, 
Anglo-American law has long recognized the general doctrine of 
laches.79 
Laches is a defense that allows a case to be dismissed if the plain- 
tiff cannot explain why he sat on his claims and if his delay substan- 
tially prejudices the defendant.80 For example, the Supreme Court 
held over a century ago that a plaintiff alleging fraud could not need- 
lessly delay a suit until after the alleged defrauder's death and thereby 
prevail more easily against the alleged defrauder's successors in inter- 
est.8' This logic could easily be blended with arguments from consti- 
79 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE ?1520 (4th ed. 1846) 
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. i836) ("Courts of Equity . .. sometimes act upon their own inher- 
ent doctrine of discouraging, for the peace of society, antiquated demands by refusing to interfere, 
where there has been gross laches in prosecuting rights .... "). 
80 The doctrine is used to "aid[ ] the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights." 
NAACP v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 753 F.2d i3i, 137 (D.C. Cir. i985), cert. 
denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (i985). To prove laches, President Clinton would have to show that Jones 
delayed in asserting her claims, that the delay was not excusable, and that her delay unduly 
prejudiced Clinton. See AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1545 (iith Cir. i986), cert. 
denied, 48i U.S. io4i (i987). Laches is not based "merely on time. Rather, laches is based upon 
changes of conditions or relationships involved with the claim." Farries v. Stanadyne/Chicago 
Div., 832 F.2d 374, 378 (7th Cir. i987) (citations omitted). The laches period begins to run when 
the plaintiff discovers the facts that create her cause of action. See Coleman v. Corning Glass 
Works, 6I9 F. Supp. 950, 953 (W.D.N.Y. i985), affd, 8i8 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. i987); see also 
Grant Airmass Corp. v. Gaymar Indus., 645 F. Supp. 1507, i5i5 (S.D.N.Y. i986) (explaining that 
courts consider whether a plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant facts in 
determining whether a claim is barred from laches). 
President Clinton's laches claim is buttressed by the lack of an explicit federal statute of limi- 
tations for Jones's civil rights claims; rather, federal law provides that state statutes and the com- 
mon law should govern. See 42 U.S.C. ? i988 (Supp. V 1993); cf Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
731, 748 & n.27 (i982) (distinguishing Nixon's case from one in which "Congress expressly had 
created a damages action against the President of the United States"). 
81 In Mackall v. Casilear, 137 U.S. 556 (I890), the Court opined: 
The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires for the peace 
of society the discouragement of stale demands. And where the difficulty of doing entire 
justice by reason of the death of the principal witness or witnesses, or from the original 
transactions having become obscured by time, is attributable to gross negligence or deliber- 
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tutional structure to impose an analogous duty on plaintiffs today to 
litigate (if possible) before a person's "death" as an ordinary citizen 
and "birth" as a President. 
Historically, as an "equity" doctrine, laches did not apply to cases 
"at law" governed by explicit statutes of limitation. After the historic 
merger of law and equity in I938, however, those old distinctions 
should matter little here.82 Other formerly "equitable" defenses, such 
as estoppel and fraud, have long been allowed to defeat actions "at 
law";83 and the Federal Circuit, at least, has squarely held en banc 
that laches may be invoked to prevent strategic manipulation in a 
"law" case even if an explicit statute of limitation applies and has not 
run.84 In any event, even if the technical equitable doctrine of laches 
is unavailable, its underlying logic can apply when understood in light 
of the dictates of constitutional structure and packaged as a matter of 
constitutional common law.85 
C. The Venue Variant 
Even if constitutional structure and history are not strong enough 
to freeze a civil suit against a sitting President, they might be strong 
enough to influence where and how the suit unfolds. Disruption of the 
President's duties should be minimized. A good argument can thus be 
made that, if a sitting President may be sued for damages, suit should 
ate delay, a court of equity will not aid a party whose application is thus destitute of 
conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence. 
The time for this son to have attacked his father on the ground of fraud was prior to that 
father's death .... 
Id. at 566 (citations omitted). 
82 See FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCE- 
DURE 430-31 (4th ed. 1992) ('[Amn equitable defense or counterclaim may be interposed to an 
action presenting only legal issues or vice versa."). 
83 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) explicitly recognizes the affirmative defenses of estop- 
pel and fraud, as well as of laches. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). 
84 In A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en 
banc), the court stated: 
[Plaintiffl is in error in its position that, where an express statute of limitations applies 
against a claim, laches cannot apply within the limitation period. In other areas of our 
jurisdiction, laches is routinely applied within the prescribed statute of limitations period 
for bringing the claim. 
. . .[Wie are unpersuaded that the technical distinction between application of laches 
against legal damages and an equitable accounting which [plaintiff] asks us to draw should 
be made. 
Id. at 1030-31 (citations and emphasis omitted); see also Technitrol Inc. v. NCR Corp., 513 F.2d 
1130, 1130 (7th Cir. 1975) (adopting the district court opinion in Technitrol Inc. v. Memorex Co., 
376 F. Supp. 828, 831 (N.D. Ill. 1974), which applied laches to damage suits). 
85 Once again, we need go no further than to recognize a Category Two presidential privilege 
that Congress may perhaps have power to modify. See supra p. 705. 
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lie only in Washington D.C.: no other court should have personal juris- 
diction or venue against an unconsenting86 sitting President. 
Several things point this way. First, the language of Article III 
and of the Judiciary Act of I789 provided that suits against foreign 
Ambassadors be tried in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, which would of course sit in the nation's capital.87 The under- 
lying logic here was geographic: ambassadors would operate out of the 
nation's capital, and suit in that city would minimize disruption of 
their duties.88 If foreign dignitaries enjoy this litigation privilege, 
should not the President a fortiori (at least in the absence of an ex- 
press congressional statute to the contrary)? 
Of course, our old friend expressio unius might argue that, if the 
Framers had meant for the President to enjoy an analogous venue 
privilege, they would have explicitly so provided in Article III along- 
side the Ambassador Clause. But perhaps the Framers were simply 
not thinking about the unusual case of a civil damage action against a 
sitting President. When they did think about suits against the Presi- 
dent, they explicitly provided that impeachment trials would take 
place in the Senate, again in the nation's capital. The Federalist Pa- 
pers explicitly emphasized the geographic logic that underlay this 
choice.89 
Recall also Jefferson's obviously geographic concern that litigation 
in "the several courts" (note the plural) would "bandy [the President] 
from pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south 
& east to west, and withdraw him" from the district and thus from 
"his constitutional duties."90 Few at the Founding would have thought 
that any court on the continent could use newfangled longarm statutes 
to reach out and grab the President of the United States.9' Jefferson 
summed it up nicely, in words that also sum up nicely much of our 
overall argument: 
As to our personal attendance in Richmond [at the Burr trial], I am per- 
suaded the Court is sensible, that paramount duties to the nation at large 
control the obligation of compliance with their summons in this case; as 
86 Venue and personal jurisdiction defenses are of course waivable. See FED. R. Civ. P. 
12 (h)(I). 
87 See U.S. CONST. art. III, ? 2, Cl. 2 ("In all Cases affecting Ambassadors . . . the supreme 
Court shall have original Jurisdiction"); Judiciary Act of 1789, ? 13, I Stat. 73, 80 (1789) (declaring 
that the Supreme Court "shall have exclusively all . .. jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against 
ambassadors, or other public ministers"). 
88 See Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section I3, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 469-78 (I989); Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA.-L. REV. 1499, I56o n.222 (1990). 
89 See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 400 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
90 See supra p. 7i8. 
91 Until the appearance of the 1945 "minimum contacts" language of International Shoe v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (i945), suits against D.C. officials were hard to bring because 
longarm jurisdiction did not exist. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (i878). 
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they would, should we receive a similar one, to attend the trials of Blen- 
nerhasset and others, in the Mississippi territory, those instituted at St. 
Louis and other places on the western waters, or at any place, other than 
the seat of government. To comply with such calls would leave the na- 
tion without an executive branch, whose agency, nevertheless, is under- 
stood to be so constantly necessary, that it is the sole branch which the 
constitution requires to be always in function. It could not then mean 
that it should be withdrawn from its station by any co-ordinate 
authority.92 
III. CONCLUSION 
In the end, we suggest that temporary immunity from arrest is the 
constitutionally preferable reading of executive immunity in many situ- 
ations. This immunity, which essentially tolls cases against a sitting 
President, avoids the twin dangers of making all Americans pay for 
the President's sins and of putting Presidents above the law. Our "ar- 
resting" conclusion is that a proper judicial holding in Clinton's favor 
could limit rather than extend the mischief of Nixon. 
92 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, supra note 67, at 232. To be sure, improved 
transportation technology facilitates travel and makes long distance litigation infinitely more feasi- 
ble than at the Founding; but why should the presidential mountain be obliged to come to plain- 
tiff Muhammad rather than vice versa? Until Congress speaks clearly to the contrary, should not 
litigation against a sitting President accommodate his unique need to operate from the nation's 
capital, supervising the government, and attending to the people's business - at least if a plain- 
tiff is responsible for the timing of a lawsuit and purposefully chooses to sue a President in 
session? 
If the suit were brought in D.C., Jones's case may be dismissed. District of Columbia courts 
in such cases apply the District's statute of limitations, even if the underlying cause of action 
occurred elsewhere. See Steorts v. American Airlines, 647 F.2d I94, I97 (D.C. Cir. i98i). How- 
ever, Jones could argue that a transfer of venue motion will allow her to carry the Arkansas 
statute of limitations with her to Washington. If the reason for transfer of venue is based on 
forum non conveniens and 28 U.S.C. ? I404(a), she may be successful. See Van Dusen v. Bar- 
rack, 376 U.S. 6I2, 639 (i964). But if President Clinton phrases the argument in terms of per- 
sonal jurisdiction and venue (as we suggest), the D.C. statute of limitations may be used: an 
Arkansas transferor court lacking personal jurisdiction and venue could not support transfer 
under Van Dusen, and transferee law would apply. See PAUL M. BATOR, DANIEL J. MELTZER, 
PAUL T. MISHKIN & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM I744-45 (3d ed. I988); I5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & ED- 
WARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE ? 3827, at 26I-67 (2d ed. I986). The D.C. 
statute of limitations for intentional torts in violation of ? i983, such as assault, is one year. See 
D.C. CODE ANN. ? I2-30I (4) (I993); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d I, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (distin- 
guishing assault cases, which have a one-year statute of limitations, from First Amendment 
claims, which have a three-year limitations period), cert. denied, 470 U.S. io84 (i985); Williams v. 
District of Columbia, 676 F. Supp. 329, 332 (D.D.C. i987). The one-year limitation also includes 
actions for "libel." See D.C. CODE ANN. ? I2-30I (4) (I993). 
